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Abstract 
This paper contributes to the research agenda on external democracy promotion by attempting 
a systematic comparison between the democracy promotion endeavors of two major interna-
tional actors, the European Union (EU) and the United States of America (US). It first out-
lines an analytical framework that is then tested for its heuristical value, applying it to EU and 
US democracy promotion efforts on a global and a regional scale, thus comparing different 
actors as well as across regions. It concludes by highlighting the differences in design and 
flexibility of their approaches and relates them to a specificity of EU external relations. While 
both actors can draw on seemingly similar tool boxes for democracy promotion, the EU tends 
to limit its own scope of action to a rather cooperative approach due to the emphasis it puts on 
the standardization and (reciprocal) formalization of relations with third countries, including 
provisions for democracy promotion. 
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I. Introduction 
It is no big news anymore to state that democracy promotion has gained a prominent place on 
the foreign policy agenda of many international actors, or to point out the increasing scholarly 
interest it has entailed in various disciplines over the last 15 years. Within this ever growing 
body of research, the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) have attracted particu-
lar attention among analysts of US foreign policy and European integration and politics re-
spectively. However, comparative studies are still rare and a transatlantic research community 
still has to emerge. In addition, there is hardly a consensus about what constitutes the subject 
matter of a common research agenda. In the midst of countless empirical studies on different 
actors and aspects in democracy promotion, there are only few proposals for a systematic 
analysis and even fewer attempts at theorization. 
Setting out to develop a systematic comparison between the EU’s and the US’ efforts 
to promote democracy, we hope to contribute with our paper to the advancement of the re-
search agenda on international democracy promotion. We will start outlining an analytical 
framework (II.) that draws on existing conceptualizations of international democracy promo-
tion to identify categories for classification and comparison. This framework is then tested for 
its heuristical value, applying it to EU and US democracy promotion efforts on a global (III.) 
and regional scale (IV.), thus comparing different actors as well as across regions. Coming 
from the studies of the EU’s neighborhood policies, we have chosen the countries of the East-
ern and Southern dimensions of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), encompassing 
the Newly Independent States (NIS) and the countries in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA). These countries represent the first real ‘hard cases’ for an EU democracy promotion 
strategy beyond enlargement. Therfore, it is particularly interesting to contrast the EU’s actual 
engagement with the US’ approaches to promoting democracy in the regions as part of its 
global engagement. 
We will conclude by highlighting the differences in design and flexibility of their ap-
proaches that we relate to a specificity of EU external relations. From the outset, the EU and 
the US can draw on seemingly similar tool boxes for democracy promotion. However, the EU 
tends to limit its own scope of action to a rather cooperative approach due to the emphasis it 
puts on the standardization and (reciprocal) formalization of relations with third countries, 
including provisions for democracy promotion.   3
II. Setting the stage: a framework for analyzing democracy promotion 
Before turning to the EU’s and US’ efforts to promote democracy, it is necessary to clearly 
delimit our understanding of the term, to tackle the question of ‘strategy’ and to develop a 
framework for the systematic analysis and comparison of democracy promotion. The estab-
lishment of ‘democracy promotion’ as a field of research has sprung from the attention drawn 
to “international dimensions of democratization” (Whitehead 1996), qualifying the exclusive 
focus on internal actors and factors to explain the emergence and outcome of democratization 
processes. Since then, most studies have implicitly chosen an understanding of ‘democracy 
promotion’ that implies agency, but have rarely ever specified what exactly falls under this 
‘activity’. In this study, we conceive (international) democracy promotion as an external ac-
tor’s open attempt to directly establish or advance democracy as a regime type in a target 
country.
 
Looking at EU and US efforts to promote democracy, we are, however, not interested 
in isolated, ad-hoc actions. As both actors are committed to democracy promotion as a general 
foreign policy goal, all measures taken can be interpreted as attempts to achieve this goal. 
This common reasoning often gives rise to the question of ‘strategy’ that, narrowly defined, 
asks for the actor’s clear assumptions about which means lead to the desired end, laid down in 
a purposefully designed master plan (Burnell 2004, 2005). The question of strategy is usually 
linked to the issue of consistency which again is discussed as crucial for the chances of suc-
cess of democracy promotion, e.g. as a necessary condition for credibility and (thus) effec-
tiveness (Hook 2002). However, most studies come to the conclusion that actors usually do 
not have such a clear strategy in the first place, which makes it difficult to look for consis-
tency in its implementation. In the absence of explicit strategies, we begin with scrutinizing 
an actor’s whole ‘universe’ of democracy promotion, i.e. the totality of infrastructure, instru-
ments, and measures. The identification of different practices or patterns of democracy pro-
motion can then lead to the ex-post classification of ‘strategies’. As pointed out before, these 
might not be consciously (or explicitly) pursued, but build on unspoken assumptions or arise 
from randomly implemented activities to promote democracy. 
Even if an actor does not develop a fully fledged strategy, his commitment to promote 
democracy as a foreign policy goal should be the starting point for the analysis of his democ-
racy promotion efforts. Answering a series of questions about the ‘who’ and ‘when’ and 
‘where’ and ‘what’ might allow some insights into the background of democracy promotion. 
Especially when comparing different actors, it is interesting to see since when democracy   4
promotion is (officially) part of the foreign policy agenda – and on what level this commit-
ment is made. In addition, motives given and links to or the ranking of different goals might 
tell a lot about the place given to democracy promotion in the general foreign policy agenda. 
The commitment might further be more or less specific about the content of democracy pro-
motion, specifying the actor’s understanding of democracy, democratization or specific goals 
and approaches, elements that could after all signify a strategy. Finally, the commitment can 
be renewed – and changed – over time. In our view, the crucial step is, however, to see how 
the general commitment translates into practice. Therefore, we now establish some categories 
that help to systematically describe and analyze what is done to promote democracy and in 
what ways. 
These ways can first of all differ in the amount and kind of resources the actor allo-
cates to the task. In practice, this means foremost to ask which actors are involved in the pro-
motion of democracy and what their responsibilities and competences as well as their re-
sources in budget and staff are. Here, it is interesting to see whether existing structures are 
used or if specific institutions for democracy promotion are created. This leads to the crucial 
link between the creation of an infrastructure for democracy promotion and the implementa-
tion of actual measures to promote democracy: tools. So the second major difference appears 
when looking at the tools that are at an actor’s disposal and the use he makes of them. 
Tools as a category are omnipresent in democracy promotion literature, although dif-
ferent studies identify different sets of “tools” (Carothers 1999: 6), “instruments” (Youngs 
2001: 357), “ways” (Burnell 2000: 7), “weapons” (Schraeder 2003: 26) or “types” (Schmitter, 
Brouwer 1999). The various ‘tool boxes’ presented are never twice the same, but most of 
them have in common that they place the different tools within a continuum of ‘intrusiveness’ 
or ‘interference’, ranging from military or coercive intervention over (economic) sanctions 
and conditionality to traditional diplomacy. Leaving out military interventions as a form of 
coercion because they openly violate the sovereignty of the target country, we regroup differ-
ent tools in two broad categories, according to the two traditional channels of (potentially) 
exerting influence in international politics: ‘diplomacy’ and ‘foreign aid’. We draw a distinc-
tion between these two channels on the basis of the respective ‘status’ of the democracy pro-
moter and the target country: In diplomatic relations, the interaction takes place between two 
– formally – equal actors, whereas foreign aid is provided by a donor to a recipient. We do not 
limit diplomacy to classical diplomatic relations, but identify several tools to promote democ-
racy that are all managed in this ‘arena’ of international relations. These are (1) Political Dia-
logue and Negotiations, (2) (unilateral) Declarations, and (3) (negative and positive) Condi-  5
tionality.
1 Foreign aid, in the form of technical and financial assistance, adds to these the tool 
of (4) Democracy Assistance. The choice between different tools is maybe the most promi-
nent and obvious one an actor has to make when setting out to promote democracy. In fact, he 
is confronted with a variety of options of how to promote democracy that are reflected in the 
choice, design and application of the different tools. These fundamental choices include (a) 
the domestic actor targeted with the activity, (b) the mechanism of influence to induce change, 
(c) the inclusion of the target country’s regime in defining and realizing the agenda of democ-
racy promotion, and (d) the disturbance of the domestic balance of power. In the following, 
the components of our tool box are linked to the different choices sketched. 
It convenes to start with the actors and mechanisms chosen, as these fundamentally de-
termine or characterize the design of the tools (see Table 1). With regard to possible domestic 
actors targeted in democracy promotion, the basic distinction is between state and non-state 
actors. By definition, all the diplomatic tools address state – mostly governmental – actors.
2 
By contrast, Democracy Assistance can be directed both at state and non-state actors. For 
identifying different mechanisms of influence, we mainly draw on studies of in international 
relations and especially the compliance literature. To induce domestic change from the out-
side is a task comparable to countering ‘non-compliance’. Depending on the perceived rea-
sons for ‘non-compliance’, different solutions are offered: A lack of will is addressed by per-
suasion (socialization approach) or by creating incentives (enforcement approach), whereas 
support tackles a lack of capacity (management approach) (see e.g. Chayes, Chayes 1993; 
Checkel 1997; Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2004; Tallberg 2002; Underdal 1998). The dif-
ferent tools for promoting democracy each correspond roughly to one of these mechanisms of 
influence. However, sometimes it is difficult to know which mechanism is actually at work. 
Thus, Political Dialogue and Negotiations give room for arguing and bargaining processes 
that can lead to social learning or manipulate the targets cost-benefit calculations through 
promises and threats. In Declarations, the democracy promoter can voice his opinion on the 
domestic situation, including open praise and criticism. Done publicly, this ‘naming and 
shaming’ can create reputational costs that function as external – negative – incentive. Posi-
tive and negative Conditionality can affect the targets cost-benefit calculation in anticipation – 
                                                 
1   Notwithstanding the classification as a diplomatic tool, conditionality can relate to the general relations be-
tween promoter and target state as well as to decisions over foreign aid. 
2   Under the heading of “public diplomacy” (e.g. Roberts 2006), examples of government-to-people diplomacy 
are discussed, especially with regard to broadcasting programs. While these programs are certainly difficult to 
classify according to our tool box, we subsume them under democracy assistance, as it is governments provid-
ing funds for informing or even educating the people of the target country. Other examples of “public diplo-
macy”, such as cultural programs carried out by embassies, should rather be seen as public relations and not 
democracy promotion efforts.   6
after promises or threats are advanced – and manifestly in its application when rewards are 
granted or sanctions imposed. Finally, Democracy Assistance is about capacity building, both 
with regard to state and non-state actors, usually through providing expertise, financial and 
material resources. 
Table 1: Democracy Promotion Tool Box 
Instruments  Influence Mechanisms  Actor 
Political Dialogue & Negotiations  Social Learning & External Incen-
tives (Bargaining) 
Unilateral Declarations  Naming & Shaming 
Diplomacy 
Positive & Negative Conditionality (on dip-
lomatic relations and aid)  
External Incentives 
(Reducing or Imposing Costs) 
State 
Foreign 
Aid 
Democracy Assistance (TA/FA)  Capacity Building and Socializa-
tion 
State and 
non-state 
 
The other two dimensions realized in the different tools are the inclusion of the targeted re-
gime and the disturbance of the domestic balance of power. The diplomatic tools can all be 
regrouped according to these dimensions (see Table 2). Regarding the inclusiveness, democ-
racy can be promoted interactively, i.e. in bilateral initiatives such as dialogue and negotia-
tions, or in one-sided or unilateral actions like declarations and the setting up and application 
of conditionality. At the same time, the diplomatic tools vary in the level of disturbance they 
cause. With the focus on shifts to the detriment of the incumbent regime, political dialogue, 
but also positive conditionality, might be considered as ‘cost-neutral’ whereas declarations 
and negative conditionality all inflict ‘costs’ on the regime. 
Table 2: Diplomatic Tools for Democracy Promotion 
Influence mechanisms   
  Social Learning  External Incentives 
Political dialogue and negotiations  Influence through rewards 
(i.e. the application of posi-
tive conditionality – can be  
linked to foreign assistance) 
Influence through persuasion 
& social learning 
 
Influence through declara-
tions (naming & shaming)  Influence through bargaining 
(including threats and prom-
ises) 
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Influence through sanctions 
(i.e. the application of nega-
tive conditionality) 
 
 
Inclusion of Regime 
 
   interactive mode                                                                         unilateral mode 
 
In contrast, democracy assistance can in itself vary in these two dimensions (see Table 3). The 
inclusion of the regime in the promoter’s agenda signifies here, in how far he operates with or   7
without the approval of the regime. The cooperation with state actors can only happen with 
approval, but addressing non-state actors, it depends on the external actor’s willingness – and 
capacity – if he forgoes the approval of the regime. This can range from simply by-passing 
the regimes (which tolerates the action) to work openly against the disapproval of the regime 
(that might take countermeasures). The level of disturbance that can be expected of the meas-
ures implemented depends very much on the choice of the specific actors targeted: the more 
politically active and critical of the regime actors are, the more support for them might pose a 
threat to the regime.
3 The perception of threat and the likelihood of open disapproval of by-
passing democracy assistance are highly interrelated. 
Table 3: Democracy Assistance 
Influence mechanism   
  Capacity Building 
Primary targets: 
• State institutions 
Primary targets: 
• State institutions 
• Gongos 
• Non political NGOs 
Primary targets: 
• State institutions 
• Gongos 
• Non political NGOs 
• Political active  NGOs 
• Gongos 
• Non political NGOs 
• Political active  NGOs 
• Media 
• Political active NGOs 
• Political parties 
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• Political active  NGOs 
• Media 
• Political active NGOs 
• Political parties 
• Exclusively opposition 
parties 
• Exclusively opposition 
parties 
• Media 
• Political active NGOs 
• Political parties 
• Exclusively opposition 
parties 
With approval  Without approval  Against disapproval   
Inclusion of regime in choosing targets 
  
    interactive mode                                                                      unilateral mode 
 
Taken together, the four ‘dimensions’ presented reflect the actor’s stance on the – more or 
less democratic or authoritarian – regime in place. Thus the design and choice of tools for 
promoting democracy add up to a (rather) cooperative or conflictive approach, viewing the 
incumbent regime as partner or adversary in the process of democratization. This is interest-
ing with regard to an actor’s interpretation of the principle of non-intervention in international 
relations and his readiness to risk the reproach of illegitimate interference in domestic affairs. 
Another set of analytical categories are the ‘areas’ of intervention or the ‘issues’ tack-
led in democracy promotion efforts. They should relate to the actor’s understanding of de-
mocracy or at least of crucial elements or aspects of a democratic regime, even if the specific 
                                                 
3   What is perceived as a threat depends heavily on the regime type: To an authoritarian regime, support to inde-
pendent media might already pose a threat, whereas a newly established democracy might only refuse the par-
tial support for oppositional forces. This should also correspond to the legal status (illegality, official recogni-
tion, etc.) of non-state actors in a country.   8
content of ‘democracy’ is not defined as part of an overarching strategy.
4 In research on de-
mocracy promotion, these aspects are often intermingled with the question of which actor is 
targeted. This is most often the case with regard to democracy assistance to non-state actors, 
where the actor – e.g. civil society, media, etc. – is equated with the area targeted. Returning 
to the basic distinction of state and non-state actors, this choice first of all tells a lot about the 
actor’s understanding of domestic reform processes and the driving forces behind. This can be 
summarized as a bottom-up or top-down approach to democratization and democracy promo-
tion. However, it does not necessarily correspond to what is seen as the essential element of 
democracy in question. For example, the objective of an active civil society can be pursued 
addressing both state and non-state actors, aiming at either the reform of the legal and institu-
tional framework (e.g. laws that guarantee the freedom of association) and the state’s per-
formance in following its own rules, or at the capacity of civil society actors to actively take 
part in domestic political processes. 
III. Approaching the actors: parallel universes of democracy promotion 
Approaching democracy promotion empirically requires a close look at the agencies used or 
specifically created both by the EU and US serving this purpose. While both actors under 
scrutiny display a general commitment, the way it translates into practice may differ. Examin-
ing their specific infrastructure means taking stock of the different agencies, their respective 
objectives, resources and tools available as well as identifying the different approaches they 
adopt. The evolution of the different agencies, their application of tools and specific ap-
proaches has developed in the two cases with different speeds and often in reaction to a rapid 
change of the international context. However, we focus on the situation as of today, only tak-
ing into account major developments, to infer distinct features of EU and US ‘strategies’ at 
the global level.  
The configuration of EU Democracy Promotion 
Today, the EU as an international actor is committed to promote democracy in its relations 
with third countries. An explicit commitment outside enlargement policies has for the first 
time appeared in 1986, in the context of development cooperation. It has been enshrined in 
                                                 
4   For a systematic analysis of the (different) definitions of democracy underlying international democracy pro-
motion efforts, it is advisable to draw on the abundant democratic theory literature. Here, we content our-
selves with opening up a continuum between narrowly defined ‘electoral democracy’ and fully fledged ‘lib-
eral democracy’ (see e.g. Diamond 1999). This corresponds to a varying focus on elections in contrast to other 
aspects such as the rule of law (human rights and fundamental freedoms, ‘democratic’ – accountable, trans-
parent, participatory, etc. – procedures) and pluralism (active civil society,  competition of political parties) in 
order to avoid ‘façade’ or ‘illiberal’ democracy (Diamond 2002; Zakaria 1997).   9
the treaties of Maastricht (1992/1993) and was thus transformed from a political commitment 
into a legal ‘obligation’, at first for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and de-
velopment cooperation, ten years later also for ‘other’ external cooperation (Nice 2001/2003). 
It is hence officially included as a foreign policy goal in both first and second pillar politics of 
the EU and thus concerns all EU institutions involved in external relations in general.
5 How-
ever, the main actors for devising and implementing democracy promotion definitely are the 
European Commission and the Council of the EU.
6 
Notwithstanding the legal commitment, there is no comprehensive policy or strategy 
for democracy promotion established. A framework has been roughly sketched in 1991, en-
visaging a predominantly ‘positive approach’, manifest in the tools of (political) dialogue, 
positive (aid) conditionality and democracy assistance (‘support’), combined with an option 
of ‘appropriate responses’ (negative conditionality), targeted at both state and non-state (‘civil 
society’) actors.
7 Over time, the Commission and the Council have developed a patchwork of 
tools and specifications for democracy promotion (European Commission 2001). With regard 
to our tool box for democracy promotion, the EU has all types of instruments at its disposal, 
either as general tools of foreign relations or as tools specifically designed for promoting de-
mocracy.  
Most of the ‘diplomatic’ tools can not be assigned to only one institution and often ne-
cessitate the interplay of several actors. Political dialogue can thus be jointly conducted by the 
Commission and Council in the context of ‘Troïka’ missions.
8 In addition, political dialogues 
are institutionalized in most multi- and bilateral agreements with third countries and subject to 
EU “Guidelines on Human Rights Dialogues” (2001).
9 Beyond dialogue, all EU institutions 
can issue public statements, be it in speeches, conclusions, or resolutions. The Council of the 
                                                 
5   We do not take into account the EU’s member states as individual actors of democracy promotion, but focus 
on the EU as external actor(s). For a complete picture of ‘European’ democracy promotion, it is of course 
necessary to consider national democracy promotion efforts as well (see e.g. Youngs 2006). 
6   Within these two institutions, the commitment to democracy promotion has only to a limited extent resulted in 
the creation of specific sub-structures. Already in 1987, the Council has created a Working Group on Human 
Rights (COHOM). Within the Commission, responsibilities for democracy promotion are integrated into the 
different General Directorates concerned, especially the DG Relex. Of course, the European Council provides 
general guidelines for external relations and plays a significant role in the CFSP. The European Parliament 
participates in the EU’s democracy promotion efforts mainly through ‘legislation’ in first pillar politics, e.g. 
with regard to external cooperation programs, via its budget competence, and as a ‘normative’ authority when 
issuing reports and resolutions. 
7   See the European Commission 1991, the Declaration on Human rights, Conclusion of the Luxembourg Euro-
pean Council (Annex V), 28-29 June 1991, and the Resolution of the council and of the member states meet-
ing in the council on human rights, democracy and development, 28 November 1991. 
8   The Troïka comprises the High representative for the CFSP, the foreign minister of the Council presidency, 
and the Commissioner for external relations (or the presidents of the European Council and the Commission). 
In addition, the Commission’s delegations in third countries are no official embassies, but they have of course 
more or less formal contacts to state (and non-state) actors in their host country 
9   Participants on the EU’s side are usually Commission and Council representatives or senior officials. As the 
dialogues are usually conducted behind closed doors, there is hardly any information on their actual content.   10
EU can furthermore use the CFSP’s instrument of Common Positions to take a stand on cur-
rent events. Another provision specifically designed for promoting democracy is the so called 
“essential element clause”, introducing a joint commitment to democracy and human rights to 
agreements between the EU and third countries (European Commission 1995). It establishes 
the normative basis for political dialogues, but also for negative conditionality, with a “sus-
pension clause” allowing for ‘appropriate measures’ to be taken (by either party of the agree-
ment) after consultations. Conditionality with regard to foreign assistance is included in the 
regulations on the EU’s external cooperation programs, but notoriously difficult to monitor. 
The most prominent example of the EU’s use of conditionality are the Copenhagen Criteria, 
where the ultimate incentive is EU membership. 
Democracy assistance has in practice been conducted by the Commission since the 
early 1990s, as a follow-up to the 1991 Resolution, using existing budget lines in develop-
ment cooperation. The European Parliament has bundled these budget lines in 1994 under the 
budget heading of the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). In 
1999, two regulations on “operations which contribute to the general objective of developing 
and consolidating democracy” finally set an end to this ‘diversion’ of funds and created a le-
gal basis for democracy assistance under the EIDHR.
10 Since 2000, the EuropeAid Coopera-
tion Office, a Commission agency, is responsible for programming and implementing projects 
under the EIDHR, supported by the Commission’s delegations in third countries. 
The EIDHR is specifically designed to (primarily) address non-state actors and one of 
its strengths has always been seen in that it “can be used without host government consent, or 
where the main EC programs are not available for other reasons, such as their having been 
suspended” (European Commission 2001: 15). However, this aspect has only been explicitly 
introduced in the preamble of the new European Instrument for Democracy and Human 
Rights for the financial perspective 2007-2013.
11 The actors targeted include all kinds public 
and private sector non-profit organizations and the new Instrument explicitly includes ‘par-
liamentary bodies’ and ‘natural persons’. The regulations all indicate a ‘financial envelope’ 
for their validity period, with the average annual allocation increasing from nearly € 70 mil-
lion in 1999 to more than € 160 million from 2007 on. However, the EU’s budget does not 
detail for what purpose and with what partners these funds are spent. This information is scat-
tered in the Commission’s programming documents and different reports. The concept of a 
                                                 
10  Council Regulations (EC) No 975/1999 and No 976/1999 of 29 April 1999. 
11  The first paragraph of the preamble claims that the new Instrument is “allowing for assistance independent 
from the consent of third country governments and other public authorities” (Regulation (EC) No 1889/2006 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006).   11
limited number of ‘focus countries’ introduced in the 2002 programming and intended to in-
crease the EIDHR’s impact (European Commission 2001) has been abolished again in 2005, 
after criticism of arbitrary country selection or rather ‘neglect’ by the European Parliament. 
In addition to the EIDHR, the objective to promote democracy has also been ‘main-
streamed’ in the cooperation programs since the mid of the 1990s and is also part of the new 
generation of financing instruments for 2007-2013.
12 In contrast to the EIDHR, the stability 
and pre-accession instruments focus on democratic institutions and the rule of law, whereas 
the ENPI also includes civil society actors as partners for democracy promotion. While these 
instruments all receive much higher appropriations than the EIDHR, it is impossible to distin-
guish the respective share spent on democracy assistance without going into the details of the 
individual programming documents at the national and regional levels. Table 4 summarizes 
the main aspects of the EU’s universe of democracy promotion. 
Table 4: The EU ‘universe’ of democracy promotion 
Agency  Tools  Actors targeted 
Guidelines for application of all tools       European Council 
Declarations   Government 
Declarations 
Decision over application: 
Conditionality 
Council of the EU 
(CFSP) 
Political dialogue 
 
Government 
Management of contractual relations    
Declarations 
Participation in: 
Political dialogue  
Suggestion for the application (and imple-
mentation) of: 
Conditionality 
 
Government 
Democracy Assistance      
Globally:  EIDHR  Æ  Non-state actors 
European Commission/ 
EuropeAid 
Regionally: regional programmes  Æ  Mainly state actors 
 
Taken together, the EU disposes of all instruments included in our tool box and can thus po-
tentially draw on both cooperative and conflictive approaches to democracy promotion. How-
ever, considering what can be learned from policy documents and a quick glance at the world-
wide application of its tools, it clearly privileges a cooperative over a conflictive approach. 
This is manifest in its emphasis on political dialogue and joint initiatives in general (even 
negative conditionality is bilaterally agreed!), its primary reliance on interactions with state 
actors and the rare instances of sanctions applied. Even the EIDHR that allows in theory a 
                                                 
12  This is the case for the instruments for development cooperation (DCI), stability (IfS), pre-accession (IPA), 
and the neighborhood policy (ENPI). The financing instrument for cooperation with industrialized and other 
high-income countries and territories (ICI) only includes very general references to democracy as one of the 
EU’s core values.   12
potentially conflictive approach to bottom-up democracy assistance encounters in practice 
manifold (bureaucratic) obstacles to working with non-state actors against the disapproval of 
the host regime. 
The configuration of US Democracy Promotion 
In contrast to the EU, the US commitment to international democracy promotion dates back to 
the era of President Wilson and World War I (Hook 2002). However, the US ‘liberal grand 
strategy’ is often questioned with regard to a ‘gap’ between rhetoric and practice (Ikenberry 
2000; Smith 2000). Thus, it is in line with the general ‘resurgence’ of democracy promotion 
on the international agenda at the end of the Cold War that the US renews its commitment and 
changes its practices, now pursuing this foreign policy goal with specific tools. While democ-
racy promotion had already been gaining importance under President Clinton (Cox 2000; 
Hook 2002), its final breakthrough as a priority issue can be seen in the much cited second 
inaugural speech of President Bush in 2005. 
This general commitment to democracy promotion is translated into practice through 
the typical set of governmental foreign policy institutions. These include (1) the White House 
or the President respectively, who is responsible for the formulation of the foreign policy 
agenda and general guidelines, (2) the Department of State as the main foreign affairs agency 
with the Secretary of State as the main foreign policy adviser to the President and (3) two ma-
jor aid agencies, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the recently 
established Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). What might indicate a clear division 
of responsibilities between these agencies, in particular with regard to diplomacy and aid, is in 
practice much more complicated. In addition, other actors are involved, with the Congress 
having a principal say on the way money is spent in foreign policies, and a network of inde-
pendent foundations that are largely funded by the government (Spence 2005). 
In March 2006 the White House has issued the latest National Security Strategy (NSS) 
that is closely linked to the foreign policy goal of democracy promotion: “It is the policy of 
the United States to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every nation 
and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.” (White House 2006: 1). 
The document sets out guidelines for the application of the whole array of tools that ought to 
be used for this purpose. In comparison to the NSS of 1998 (White House 1998), democracy 
promotion has not only gained importance (ranking now first instead of third among the top 
priorities), but also the pronunciation of different tools has changed. While the NSS of 1998 
mentions dialogue on human rights as a tool, the NSS of 2006 does not. At the same time 
more ‘disturbing’ tools seem to play a more prominent role, with conditionalities being estab-  13
lished much more explicitly and open commitment to “supporting publicly democratic re-
formers in repressive regimes” (White House 2006: 6).
13  
The Department of State – the governmental agency that implements these guidelines 
in US foreign relations on a daily basis – has established in 2006 an Advisory Committee on 
Democracy Promotion that is made up of (former) officials as well as independent experts 
from academic institutions and non-governmental organizations. Also since 2006, the general 
coordination of US democracy assistance is incumbent to the Director of U.S. Foreign Assis-
tance at the level of a Deputy Secretary of State, who is at the same time USAID Administra-
tor. The Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) is the section of utmost im-
portance for issues related to democracy promotion. It regularly issues country reports on hu-
man rights practices as well as reports on US efforts to advance democracy in the world.
14 
Furthermore, it has the oversight of the Human Rights and Democracy Fund (HRDF), estab-
lished in 1998, which is a tool for democracy assistance. The amount of money allocated for 
the HRDF increased from $7.8 million in 1998 to $48.1 million in 2005. The list of projects 
financed by the HRDF indicates that it addresses non-state actors and thus the development of 
democratic societies rather than state institutions.  
The governmental agency of most importance with regard to democracy assistance in 
the US is, however, USAID (Melia 2005). Since its foundation in 1961, it has been operating 
relatively independently from the Department of State, although there are currently many 
changes underway that attempt to improve alignment of diplomacy and aid. USAID is a 
highly decentralized agency, with about 90 missions world wide and rather small headquar-
ter.
15 At Washington, USAID is divided into four regional and three functional sections, one 
of which is the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance. The most im-
portant subsections regarding democracy assistance are the Offices for Democracy and Gov-
ernance and Transition Initiatives. Democracy assistance is defined by USAID as the promo-
tion of “the rule of law and human rights, transparent and fair elections coupled with a com-
petitive political process, a free and independent media, stronger civil society and greater citi-
zen participation in government, and governance structures that are efficient, responsive and 
accountable.”
16 Because of the decentralized organizational structure it is, however, impossi-
ble to give a clear account of the resources employed for these purposes. USAID has re-
                                                 
13  This tendency Timothy Garton Ash describes as a combination of Wilsonianism with power (2004: 151).  
14  The State Departments reports on “Supporting Human Rights and Democracy. The U.S. Record” are issued 
since 2003, following a legal requirement established by the Congress. 
15  According to USAID less than a quarter of the total workforce is situated in Washington. Further, the field 
missions take responsibility for the design and implementation of programs in a given country; see 
http://www.usaid.gov/policy/par06/highlights_002.html, May 6, 2007. 
16  http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance, May 6, 2007.   14
quested a global budget of $3.4 billion in 2006 for its own programs and additional resources 
for programs jointly managed with the Department of State or other Departments.
17 The share 
of democracy assistance is difficult to discern as the resources allocated for the functional 
offices mentioned above add up to only $71 million and the resources managed through the 
regional sections and field offices may be employed for various purposes, democracy assis-
tance being one among many. For comparison, another publication of USAID mentions a to-
tal of $1.2 billion for democracy assistance in 2004 (USAID 2005b: 25). Measures of democ-
racy assistance address both state and non-state actors (USAID 2005a). The relative weight of 
bottom-up and top-down approaches depends on the country context, in particular with regard 
to the regime in place. In authoritarian regimes USAID rather targets non-state actors, while 
state actors seem to be the primary targets in countries engaged in democratization or consoli-
dation processes (USAID 2005a). In the context of autocracies, non-state actors expressly 
include political parties, media or politically relevant NGOs, whereby USAID is voluntarily 
risking the “blame [of] ‘outside interference’” by the government in place (USAID 2005b: 
25). USAID thus indicates its readiness for a conflictive approach under certain circumstances.  
As indicated above, an important part of the US democracy promotion toolbox is con-
ditionality, both applied to general bilateral relations, e.g. economic sanctions, as well as to 
decisions over foreign aid. With regard to assistance, a set of eligibility criteria establishes the 
conditions under which countries qualify as recipients. The form and level of assistance is, 
however, not only subject to these criteria, but can also largely depend on whether a particular 
country or policy goal is in line with US geo-strategic interests and thus considered of high 
priority (USAID 2006: 4-5; see also Carothers 1999: 5). After all, only a few criteria are di-
rectly related to democracy and democratization and thus qualify as tools for democracy pro-
motion. At the global level of US foreign assistance, there is only one such criterion: in the 
case of human rights violations, assistance to the government of the respective country may 
not be provided.
18  Recent efforts of the US government to link foreign assistance more 
closely to conditionality manifest themselves in the founding of the second major assistance 
agency in 2004, the Millennium Challenge Corporation. Though not providing democracy 
assistance as such, a demanding set of conditions must be met by countries for eligibility. 
With regard to democracy, the respective indicators range from civil liberties and political 
rights to good governance related criteria. Countries meeting these criteria sign a multi-year 
agreement and receive substantial funding mainly for economic development. Table 5 sum-
marizes the main aspects of the US universe of governmental democracy promotion.  
                                                 
17  http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/administrator.html, May 6, 2007. 
18  Foreign Assistance Act, §116.   15
Table 5: The US ‘universe’ of democracy promotion 
Agency  Tools  Actors targeted 
Guidelines for application of all tools       President/White House 
Declarations   Government 
Declarations 
Conditionality 
Political dialogue/ negotiations 
 
Government 
Department of State 
Democracy Assistance   Non-state  actors 
MCC  Technical Positive Conditionality with 
regard to Assistance 
 Government 
USAID Democracy  Assistance    State actors and non-state actors 
 
In addition to these governmental agencies, the US foreign policy budget devotes substantial 
funding for democracy assistance to the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). The 
NED is an independent foundation that was established on the initiative of President Reagan 
in 1983, very much following the example of the German Stiftungen. It receives substantial 
funding out of the US budget and can thus be seen to complement the democracy assistance 
efforts of the governmental agencies through measures that are targeting non-state actors, in-
cluding political (opposition) parties. NED’s ever growing core budget has exceeded $74 mil-
lion in 2006. 
  All in all, the US also disposes of all tools for democracy promotion, allowing the 
choice between cooperative and conflictive approaches, and equally claims to combine top-
down and bottom-up approaches. It is interesting to note that in the State Department, a close 
institutional link is established between on the one hand official diplomacy and on the other 
hand a bottom-up and potentially conflictive approach to democracy assistance, both directly 
through the management of the HRDF and indirectly through funding for the NED. 
Comparing the EU and the US: surprising similarity or striking difference? 
Comparing the EU’s and US’ approaches to democracy promotion, it is interesting to see that 
their infrastructures are at first sight surprisingly similar, in that they both have the whole 
range of diplomatic and assistance tools at their disposal. There are, however, important dif-
ferences in their emphasis on as well as design and use of the different tools. Overall, the EU 
democracy promotion is driven by a rather cooperative approach whereas the US more clearly 
conceives cooperative and conflictive approaches as two real alternatives. For the EU, this 
clearly relates to its strong commitment to standardized and highly institutionalized relations 
that preferably build on ‘co-ownership’. In contrast, the US reserves the right to design its 
relations to other countries on a case-by-case basis, driven by mostly unilateral concerns. This 
general finding has serious implications for the realities of the top-down and bottom-up ap-
proaches that both actors equally claim to follow. Thus, a cooperative approach limits the   16
scope of action when targeting non-state actors, potentially reducing the EU’s efforts to a 
weak two-track approach within a rather rigid and bureaucratic framework. In comparison, 
the US appears to be more flexible in handling a real multi-track approach. This applies espe-
cially when taking into account the option of delegating potentially conflictive democracy 
assistance to independent agencies. 
IV. Approaching the regions: differently? 
After this first attempt at comparing EU and US approaches to democracy promotion on a 
global scale, we now turn to see in how far they have distinct regional ‘strategies’. Here, we 
are both interested in variance between the global and regional levels and between regions. 
We assume that the regional level might be of importance in shaping democracy promotion in 
individual countries as most international actors will build their foreign policies on regionally 
perceived challenges. It might thus ‘filter’ the ‘global strategy’ due to (slightly) different 
goals and objectives, independently of the specific country context. 
As indicated before, we have chosen the Newly Independent States (NIS) and the 
countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region as two regions to compare the 
EU’s and the US’ efforts to promote democracy. However, coming from the studies of the 
EU’s recent European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), in these two regions we are especially 
interested in the countries covered by the ENP’s Eastern and Southern dimensions.
19 Beyond 
all their differences, the countries are for the most part not consolidated democracies and 
largely considered as ‘hard cases’ for democracy promotion. Furthermore, there are no major 
global players in the two regions (with the exception of Russia) and in both cases there is a 
very limited degree of intra-regional integration.  
Looking for ‘regional strategies’, we are asking first how different actors deal differ-
ently with the same region before comparing how one actor deals differently with different 
regions. This includes on the one hand investigating how the actors frame these regions in 
their foreign policies and if they have specific policy frameworks for the regions in general, 
on the other hand the analysis of their specific democracy promotion efforts in the regions, 
looking for a regional commitment, the infrastructure in place and their use of tools to pro-
mote democracy.
20 
                                                 
19  These are Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine for the NIS and Algeria, Egypt, 
Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, and Tunisia for the MENA region. 
20  While we are of course looking at the whole tool box, it is difficult to analyze the use of declarations as a 
democracy promotion tool on the regional level. Even general statements would necessitate a comprehensive 
analysis for each country, considering both declarations issued and domestic developments.   17
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region 
Different actors within the EU and the US have different framings for what we call the 
‘MENA region’. However, our set of countries is always covered by one region. While this 
region is sometimes enlarged by the Gulf or even South-East Asian countries, the MENA 
countries are never regrouped in different regions, e.g. (North) Africa as opposed to the Mid-
dle East. 
The EU and the MENA region 
The EU’s policy towards countries in the Middle East and North Africa has evolved since the 
creation of the EEC in 1957 from purely bilateral contacts to a regional ‘Mediterranean’ pol-
icy (Pierros et al. 1999; Philippart 2003). Euro-Mediterranean relations are marked today by 
two comprehensive – complementary – frameworks: the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
(EMP) launched in 1995 with the Barcelona Declaration and the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP) promulgated in 2003. While the EMP includes a multilateral track, the so-called 
Barcelona Process, the ENP further develops bilateral relations. In addition, the European 
Council has set general guidelines with its Common Strategy on the Mediterranean in 2000 
(valid until 2006) and the Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East in 
2004.
21 The regional approach to the MENA countries is manifest in the multilateral track of 
relations, the standardization of bilateral relations in a set of Euro-Mediterranean Association 
Agreements (EMAA) and the Action Plans (AP) under the ENP, as well as in the regionally 
defined external cooperation program MEDA and its successor ENPI. However, there are 
some country-specific exceptions with regard to Turkey (as was the case for Cyprus and 
Malta) as a candidate country, Israel due to its historic, political and socio-economic situation, 
and Libya against which sanctions based on UN Security Council resolutions were only re-
cently lifted.
22 And even more generally, the regional approach goes hand in hand with coun-
try-specific variation, e.g. with regard to the timing of EMAA and the levels of funding under 
MEDA. 
The EU is reportedly committed to promote democracy in the MENA countries since 
1990 (European Commission 1991: 3). Thus, democracy promotion has been part of the EMP 
since its beginnings, even though an explicit, open and high-level regional commitment is 
included for the first time in the Common Strategy of 2000. Already since the early 1990s, the 
                                                 
21  Common Strategy (2000/458/CFSP) of the European Council of 19 June 2000 on the Mediterranean region 
and Presidency Conclusions on a Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East, European 
Council, 17 and 18 June 2004. 
22   In general, the EU tries to treat the Middle East Peace Process outside the general framework of Euro-
Mediterranean relations. The Libyan exception becomes even more apparent when considering that the Euro-
pean Commission has established delegations in all Mediterranean countries except Libya.   18
EU has applied ‘global’ democracy promotion tools and integrated democracy promotion in 
its regional policy. 
The formalized multi- and bilateral political dialogues in the frameworks of the Barce-
lona Process (Senior Officials) and the EMAA (Association Councils) are all supposed to 
address issues of democracy and democratization. While there have been efforts to strengthen 
the multilateral dialogue around 2000, it seems that the Commission now privileges the bilat-
eral contacts and tries to ‘depoliticize’ the issue with the creation of ‘technical’ sub-
committees on human rights since about 2003 (European Commission 2003b: 11, 13).
23 
Similar to the political dialogue, the EU has institutionalized different forms of de-
mocratic conditionality in its relations with Mediterranean countries. Conditions and conse-
quences are either bilaterally ‘agreed’ (EMAA, APs) or unilaterally enshrined in EU policy 
documents on the ENP and legal instrument (MEDA regulations). The provisions cover nega-
tive (implementation of EMAA and external cooperation programs), positive (development or 
bilateral relations under the ENP), and a sort of ‘dynamic’ conditionality related to program-
ming of foreign assistance. However, the ‘essential element’ clauses have never been invoked 
by the EU to justify ‘appropriate measures’ nor are funding levels under MEDA openly linked 
to the political situation in the recipient countries – observers rather see a link to economic 
reform (Youngs 2002). Moreover, it is questionable whether the degree of cooperation under 
the ENP really depends on an ‘objectively’ stated progress or also on the political will of the 
neighbors, e.g. refusing to negotiate Action Plans in the first place. 
The EU has two major external cooperation programs to channel democracy assistance 
to MENA countries: the regional MEDA (I+II) program and its successor ENPI as well as the 
global EIDHR. The MEDA regulations include a commitment to promote democracy since 
1998 that is taken on by the new ENPI. However, there are no official statistics on how much 
funding is going into democracy-related projects. In programming documents for MEDA II, 
democracy assistance projects appear under different headings such as ‘rule of law’, ‘institu-
tion building’, and ‘civil society’ and mostly target state actors, especially the judiciary, but 
also non-state actors.
24 In any case, MEDA and ENPI projects are subject to framework con-
ventions between the EU and the recipient countries and can thus be considered to be rather 
‘inclusive’ or consensual. Here lies the main difference to the EIDHR that explicitly reserves 
                                                 
23  It is already difficult to obtain any detailed information about the content of these dialogues. However, it is 
even more difficult to trace potential informal dialogues as part of ‘traditional’ diplomatic relations, i.e. 
through delegations in the countries or during visits of EU officials in the region. The European Commission 
has established delegations in all MENA countries except Libya. 
24  The share of MEDA funding allocated to democracy assistance projects varies in the National Indicative Pro-
grammes 2002-2004 and 2004-2006 between 2-30%.   19
the right to operate without governmental approval, nevertheless including state-actors as po-
tential recipients. Similar to the MEDA program, however, it is difficult to discern the share 
of the EIDHR’s budget that is reserved for or spent on the MENA region. Different Commis-
sion reports only allow the very general observation that it has grown from about €1-2 million 
per year in the early 1990s to about €10 million per year under the MEDA Democracy Pro-
gramme (1996-1999) and to about €15 million per year under the second EIDHR regulation 
after 2001.
25 
The US and the MENA region 
The US might has a much longer history of diplomatic relations with MENA countries, but 
until recently, it did not have a clear set policy framework for the region as a whole. The only 
regional issues of interest have been Israel and the Middle East conflict. The US maintains 
diplomatic relations with all MENA countries, albeit on very different levels. Apart from a 
variety of sectoral agreements, the US has different kinds of commercial – free trade or in-
vestment – agreements with all countries in the region except for Syria and Libya due to their 
classification as ‘state sponsors of terrorism’.
26 This classification also implies ineligibility to 
US foreign assistance and several other sanctions, reducing diplomatic relations to a very low 
level. But also for countries eligible to US foreign assistance, levels of funding vary to the 
degree that two countries, Israel and Egypt, together receive more than 90% of all US foreign 
assistance provided to the region (Sharp 2006: 7). The US has embassies in all MENA coun-
tries, whereas USAID only has missions in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and West 
Bank/Gaza. Only recently, the US has started some comprehensive initiatives aimed at the 
(‘broader’) ‘Middle East’. Most prominent is the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) 
announced by Secretary of State Collin Powel in 2002, which includes four ‘pillars’ of coop-
eration and receives special funding out of the Economic Support Fund. It is complemented 
by plans for a US-Middle East Free Trade Area. In 2004, the US also pushed for a multilateral 
“Partnership for Progress and a Common Future with the Region of the Broader Middle East 
and North Africa” that brings together the G-8 and countries of the region for cooperation on 
political and economic issues.
27 
The MENA region has always been included in the US global commitment to and ef-
forts at democracy promotion. However, attention to the region’s ‘unsatisfactory’ political 
                                                 
25  According to the EIDHR programming document for 2002-2004, focus countries in the region were Algeria, 
Israel and the West Bank/Gaza Strip, and Tunisia, receiving together about €5 million annually. 
26  However, Libya has been taken from the list in late 2006 and negotiations on bilateral agreements have al-
ready started. The list of ‘state sponsors of terrorism’ is kept up-to-date by the State Department, 
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm. 
27  The initiative is usually referred to as the “Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) Initiative”.   20
situation has increased dramatically after the events of September 2001, establishing democ-
racy promotion in the MENA region as one of the major challenges in the ‘war on terrorism’ 
(Carothers, Ottaway 2005), not least in a speech by President Bush at the NED in 2003. Thus, 
both MEPI and the BMENA Initiative are explicitly designed as comprehensive endeavors to 
promote democracy – and prosperity and security – in the region. 
Political dialogue seems to be confined to contacts between US (embassy) officials 
and their partners in the host country. According to the State Department’s reports on US de-
mocracy promotion, this includes not only state actors, but also various non-state actors such 
as representatives of religious groups, trade unions, and NGOs. Compared to the EU, the US 
does not have similarly institutionalized forms of political dialogue. Nevertheless, the “Forum 
for the Future”, the annual ministerial conference and core of the BMENA Initiative, can be 
considered as a multilateral, high-level dialogue that also addresses political issues.
28 In addi-
tion, a “Democracy Assistance Dialogue” under the coordination of Italy, Turkey, and Yemen 
and three partner NGOs has been established in the BMENA framework. 
In contrast to the EU, the US does not use bilaterally agreed democratic conditionality, 
as in the EMAA and AP, but relies instead on extensive rules and criteria for a country’s ‘eli-
gibility’ to agreements and foreign assistance. A specificity regarding aid conditionality can 
be found in the annual foreign operations appropriations acts concerning Egypt, stipulating 
that “cash transfer assistance shall be provided with the understanding that Egypt will under-
take significant economic and political reforms which are additional to those which were un-
dertaken in previous fiscal years”.
29 Since 2005, the MCC mechanism of positive condition-
ality linked to foreign assistance has gained importance for the MENA countries under scru-
tiny here. Since then, more and more of them have qualified as candidates (Algeria, Egypt, 
Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia), but only few have passed the crucial second test of selection 
criteria, including that for “just and democratic governance”. Thus, Morocco was eligible in 
2005 and 2006, but has not yet managed to negotiate a MC compact.
30 Jordan is eligible in 
2007 and has already received support in 2006 under the Threshold Program. 
There are various sources of democracy assistance to MENA countries that are diffi-
cult to assign to specific funds and actors managing and implementing them. The State De-
                                                 
28  The Forum fort he Future brings together representatives of the G-8 and their MENA partners. The first three 
fora were held in Morocco (2004), Bahrain (2005), and Jordan (2006), co-organized by the host country and 
the respective G-8 presidency. 
29  Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriation Act (FOAA), 2006, Public Law 
109-102, November 14, 2005, 119 Stat. 2180; Sharp only remarks in his report that this clause has been in-
cluded in the FOAA “for years” (2006: 23). 
30  The proposed compact previews $703 million over five years, but has not been signed yet. It is not clear what 
will happen to the negotiations in the face of Morocco not having passed the eligibility test again for 2007.   21
partment funds democracy assistance projects in the MENA region under the global HRDF 
and the regionally specific MEPI. However, part of the HRDF funding is channeled to the 
NED’s Democracy in the Muslim World program and projects under MEPI are in part ‘sup-
ported’ by the USAID. The HRDF funding for projects in MENA countries (individually and 
regionally) has dramatically increased in absolute figures from $55,000 in 1998 to over $7 
million in 2004, with its share of total HRDF funding multiplying in 2001/2002.
31 These pro-
jects mainly target non-state actors, focusing on support to democratic activists, women’s and 
human rights NGOs, media, and trade unions, but also on reform of the judiciary, including 
both legal reform and training of non-state actors. In addition, several projects are concerned 
with broader information and education of citizens. In the framework of MEPI, the annual 
budget for democracy assistance projects in the political pillar has been about $20 million 
since 2003, counting for about a quarter of the total MEPI budget.
32 Here as well, projects 
mostly target non-state actors (‘activists’, political parties, NGOs, citizens) in the four “goal 
areas” of elections and political processes, civil society and reform advocacy, media, and rule 
of law. 
USAID, in turn, can make use of its functional and regional bureaus to provide democ-
racy assistance in the MENA region. Thus, the Office of Transition Initiatives has been active 
in the West Bank/Gaza on issues of government responsiveness and participation, giving out 
grants to both governmental and non-governmental actors. Its budget for the West Bank/Gaza 
has averaged $1-2 million per year since 2005. With respect to the Office of Democracy and 
Governance, the share of funding going to the MENA region is not discernible. The Congres-
sional Budget Justification (CBJ) for 2007, for example, does not list single project activities 
and specific actors or countries are only sometimes mentioned. Finally, the ‘democracy and 
governance’ website of the Bureau for Asia and the Near East indicates that there are democ-
racy and governance programs with Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and the West 
Bank/Gaza.
33 Drawing again on the CBJ for 2007, however, it is only possible to locate the 
respective country programs and budget appropriations for Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Mo-
rocco.
34  Projects for democracy assistance are included in different programs, sometimes 
combined with other objectives of social or economic development, so the relevant budget 
should be compared according to the ‘sector’ (democracy and governance) addressed. While 
                                                 
31  See http://www.state.gov/g/drl/c7607.htm, May 6, 2007. 
32  See http://mepi.state.gov/, May 6, 2007. 
33  See http://www.usaid.gov/locations/asia_near_east/sectors/dg/, May 6, 2007. 
34  There is no USAID mission to Algeria and so there are no country pages. For the West Bank/Gaza strip, the 
budget justification has been postponed due to the political situation and changes to the US’ foreign assistance 
in general.   22
Jordan, Lebanon, and Morocco all receive democracy assistance funding on a similar scale, 
varying between $6 and $14 million, Egypt has received over $80 million in 2006 and 2007 
respectively. This is in line with another specificity of the FOAA mentioned above, that de-
termines that at least $50 million of ‘project assistance’ provided “shall be made available for 
democracy, human rights and governance programs”. In addition, it specifies since 2005 that 
“with respect to the provision of assistance for Egypt for democracy and governance activities, 
the organizations implementing such assistance and the specific nature of that assistance shall 
not be subject to the prior approval by the Government of Egypt” (FOAA 2006: 2180). De-
mocracy assistance managed by the regional bureau has different priority fields of action in 
different countries, with corruption, elections, civil society, justice, legislative processes and 
local government being the most common. In most fields, both state and non-state actors are 
addressed, sometimes focusing on the one or the other. 
Finally, the NED is directly involved in US governmental democracy assistance in the 
MENA countries. As mentioned before, it has a ‘Democracy in the Muslim World’ program 
that receives HRDF funding. Furthermore, the NED is a partner in implementing MEPI pro-
jects. These two examples suggest a close link between the NED and the US Department of 
State. 
Promoting democracy in MENA countries – comparing the EU and the US 
Taken together, EU and US efforts to promote democracy in the MENA countries take place 
in very different regional policy frameworks. The EU has elaborated a regional, ‘Mediterra-
nean’, approach over time that is reflected in highly standardized bilateral relations, strength-
ened by the ENP, and overarching multilateral framework since 1995. The US has a longer 
tradition of bilateral relations, but it has only recently – after the events of September 11, 
2001 – developed a distinct regional approach with specific programs and multilateral ele-
ments. It also seems that the EU has the longer open and strong commitment to promote de-
mocracy in the region. It makes systematically use of global formalized democracy promotion 
tools and complements them with specific regional tools such as the political dialogue in the 
Barcelona Process. Here, we find the same patterns of standardization and reliance on a coop-
erative approach as on the global level. Nevertheless, there is significant country-variation in 
the application of these tools that needs to be checked for consistency against the EU’s ex-
plicit claims. The US engagement in the region in general and regarding democracy promo-
tion coincides with and continues pre-existing differences in the treatment of specific coun-
tries, especially Israel and Egypt. Interestingly, both actors have the most problematic rela-
tions with the same two countries, Syria and Libya. In the case of the US, sanctions applied   23
correspond to its global provisions on the design of bilateral relations. For the EU, it is a ques-
tion of inclusion in the regional framework, either fundamentally in the framework as such or 
in the set of EMAA in particular. 
The Newly Independent States 
Neither the EU nor the US has a regional framing that exactly corresponds to the NIS. For 
example, the EU has singled out the Baltic Republics early on in the accession process. 
Within the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the remaining former Soviet Union succes-
sion states are included in ‘Europe & Eurasia’. The US Department of State draws a distinc-
tion between ‘Europe and Eurasia’ that covers Russia, the Southern Caucasus states, the 
Western NIS plus all other European states on the one hand, and ‘South and Central Asia’ on 
the other hand. USAID, in turn, also refers to the Central Asian states under the ‘Europe and 
Eurasia’ heading. 
The EU and the Newly Independent States 
The policy of the European Union towards the region has its roots in the dramatic political 
change in Eastern Europe at the beginning of the 1990s. Shortly prior to the break-up of the 
Soviet Union the EU had launched an aid package that was supposed to support beginning 
market reforms, later titled as “Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent 
States” (TACIS).
35 In 1991, it still covered the Baltic Republics, albeit they already struggled 
for independence. Between 1997 and 1999 the relations between the EU and most of the NIS 
were formalized through the conclusion of relatively standardized Partnership and Coopera-
tion Agreements (PCA).
36 Thus, the EU has developed a regional framework similar to that of 
the Barcelona-Process, only lacking the multilateral track. Further differentiation among the 
NIS has occurred with the introduction of the ENP. The Eastern dimension of the ENP origi-
nally embraced Moldova and Ukraine (and potentially Belarus). In 2004, Armenia, Azerbai-
jan and Georgia were also included. For all these countries bilaterally negotiated Action Plans 
have been set up in order to further intensify relations. The Central Asian states up to now 
lack a comparable advancement, but the current German Presidency of the EU has the devel-
opment of strategy towards these states on its agenda (Federal Government of Germany 
2007:21). 
The commitment of the European Union to promote democracy in the NIS has only 
gradually developed during the 1990s. For example, TACIS had been until 1996 above all 
                                                 
35  Council Regulation No 2157/91 of 15 July 1991. 
36  The PCAs display similarities in structure and many important features as regards common institutions or 
conditionality.  The scope of cooperation envisaged however clearly varies from country to country appar-
ently correlating with geopolitical importance and geographic proximity.     24
targeting “economic reform and recovery” with the idea of “thereby reinforcing democracy”, 
before the third regulation finally made democratic progress a condition for assistance.
37 The 
growing role of democracy for further developing relations to the NIS has become obvious 
with the conclusion of the PCAs. In the case of both Belarus and Turkmenistan, PCAs have 
been signed in the 1990s, but features of authoritarian rule have inhibited ratification up to 
now. The PCAs in force with the other countries emphasize a regular and institutionalized 
political dialogue as the central tool for addressing issues linked to democracy and human 
rights. The recently concluded Action Plans have further boosted democracy and good gov-
ernance making them top priorities on the commonly agreed agenda. In how far these issues 
have gained importance in the day to day practice of the bilateral relations remains unclear. 
Similar to the EU relations with the MEDA countries, conditionality formally plays an 
important role in the EU’s policy towards the NIS. All PCAs define respect for democratic 
principles and human rights as essential elements of the relations and reserve the right to take 
‘appropriate measures’ in cases of their serious violations. In practice, however, the EU has 
only once applied (negative) conditionality invoking this clause, leading to the partial suspen-
sion of the PCA with Uzbekistan.
38 The PCAs further include an element of positive condi-
tionality, linking technical assistance inter alia with progress of reforms. In the case of Geor-
gia this kind of conditionality was reinforced by an extraordinary Country Strategy Paper in 
2003 that recognized lacking commitment for reform on the side of the Georgian government 
(European Commission 2003a:4). Under the ENP framework positive conditionality has been 
further strengthened. The APs emphasize that progress in implementing the commonly agreed 
agenda including those measures linked to common values that will influence the enhance-
ment of future relations and levels of support (European Commission 2006b:4). 
With regard to democracy assistance both the global program EIDHR and the regional 
TACIS (and now ENPI) program can be deployed for the NIS. TACIS, having originally been 
set up to support economic transition, has gradually enclosed issues related to the improve-
ment of governance and democracy. Since 1999 the program directly addresses the promotion 
of democracy and the rule of law.
39 The share of resources employed for democracy promo-
tion can hardly be determined, as the EU groups the category of ‘Government & Civil Soci-
ety’ together with Education, Health, and Water under the heading of ‘Social infrastructures’ 
(European Commission 2006a:52). This sector has accounted for about 40-50% of the total 
                                                 
37  Council Regulation 2053/93 of 19 July 1993 and Council Regulation 1279/96 of 25 June 1996. 
38  In 2005 the EU has largely suspended the PCA of Uzbekistan, due to the Andijan massacre and the lacking 
will of the Uzbek government to permit the incident to be investigated by an independent commission. Fur-
ther sanctions applied include a visa ban for certain officials.  
39  Council Regulation 99/2000 of 29 December 1999,  Art.1, Annex II.   25
budget between 2002 and 2005, but only country-specific project lists can give some indica-
tion of the concrete use of TACIS funds. With regard to the actors targeted and the general 
approach the same conclusions can be drawn as already done for the MENA region. TACIS 
mainly addresses state actors and follows a rather cooperative approach.  
The US and the Newly Independent States 
The US has quickly responded to the dissolution of the Soviet Union by recognizing the NIS, 
establishing bilateral ties to all countries and issuing a major assistance programme covering 
the whole region except for the Baltic republics. Thus, at the beginning a relatively consistent 
policy framework seemed to develop. Aside from dealing with the military heritage of the 
Soviet Union the central objective of the US engagement in the NIS has been the “support of 
democratic reforms and free markets”.
40  In the following, bilateral trade and investment 
agreements have been concluded with most of the countries concerned.
41 Differentiations, 
however, have developed in the course of the 1990s with regard to the quality of diplomatic 
relations as well as levels of both military and development assistance.
42 Recognizing that the 
pace of political reform and democratization processes in the NIS has not matched those of 
the former communist countries of Central Eastern Europe, the US Government has relied 
more and more on a strategy of “selective engagement”.
43 With regard to political dialogue, 
there is no institutionalized forum on the regional level. Bilateral relations are primarily pur-
sued through meetings with US officials and the embassies. Declarations on issues related to 
democracy and democratization have been likewise mainly issued with regard to specific 
countries and contexts. 
As in the case of the MENA region, the US does not make use of bilaterally agreed 
conditionality in its relations with the NIS. Rather, the commitment to reform of a particular 
government is one important factor for the general course of relations. Sanctions have only in 
the case of Belarus been applied.
44 Conditionality with regard to assistance has become in-
creasingly important in the US policy towards the NIS. The 1992 Freedom Support Act (FSA), 
under which the main part of assistance to the NIS has been enacted, includes several con-
                                                 
40  President Bush, Statement on signing the FREEDOM Support Act, October 24, 1992, Washington, Download 
under: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=21658, (latest Access: 05/10/07). 
41  Negotiations with both Tajikistan and Turkmenistan over an investment agreement have stalled. In the cases 
of Belarus and Uzbekistan such agreements have been signed, but have never entered into force due to the 
economic and political situation and a lack of commitment to reform of both governments.    
42  These differentiations can be partly explained by the general configuration of US interests towards specific 
countries as well as by the US perception of the commitment of some governments to democratic change.     
43  Originally this term was used with regard to Belarus in combination with allegations of violations of Freedom 
of Speech and Assembly in 1997 (see http://minsk.usembassy.gov/utils/eprintpage.html) and later on extended 
to the NIS in general. 
44  The Belarus Democracy Act of 2004 implicated restrictions on loans and investments. After the 2006 presi-
dential election that failed OSCE standards, further sanctions have been imposed.        26
straints on the deliverance of assistance. With regard to democracy promotion, it requires the 
President to take into account progress in democratic and economic reform, respect for human 
rights and international law when deciding on assistance. Furthermore, assistance is prohib-
ited when countries engage “in consistent pattern of human rights violations”.
45 However, 
while levels and targets of assistance have changed over time, in no single case this prohibi-
tion has taken effect. As described above conditionality is further linked with the Millennium 
Challenge Account. Three countries of the region, Armenia, Georgia and Ukraine, have so far 
qualified for Compact Agreements.
46  The Kyrgyz Republic is eligible for a Threshold 
Agreement.  
Assistance has been a central tool in US democracy promotion efforts towards the NIS. 
Soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union the region has become one of the main target ar-
eas for assistance. Between 1992 and 2005 almost $12 billion FSA funds had been appropri-
ated.
47 Except for Russia, the biggest recipient has been Ukraine. Armenia, Georgia and the 
Kyrgyz Republic have also received exceptionally high levels of funding. At the end of the 
1990s doubts in the US administration increased whether these high levels of assistance really 
met the objective of improving the democratic state of affairs. In reaction to the mixed per-
formance of the targeted countries two major conclusions were drawn. First, assistance 
seemed to be ineffective, if the recipient governments were not committed to reform (FY 
2000:1f.).
48 Second, more assistance ought to be shifted to “grassroots programs such as ex-
changes, support for non-governmental organizations, independent media, Internet access, 
and small business” (FY 1999:1). The terrorist attacks of September 11
th have somewhat 
jeopardized a more selective and coherent approach on democracy assistance towards the NIS. 
Due to the increased relevance of issues linked to the global war on terror, the democratic 
state of affairs has lost relevance for the pursuit of bilateral relations in general. For instance, 
in 2000, Uzbekistan has been severely criticised for events in 1999, but the report of 2001 
marks Uzbekistan as a “critical ally”. Subsequently, US Assistance to Uzbekistan in 2002 has 
been nearly five times higher than in 2000. The most recent report shows that between 8 and 
40% of the assistance have been devoted to democracy promotion in 2005 in the NIS. High 
levels of democracy assistance can be observed in ‘hard cases’ such as Belarus or Turkmeni-
stan, while the total amount of assistance for these countries is very low. The increased em-
                                                 
45  Freedom Support Act, Title II.  
46  Georgia and Armenia have already signed these agreements and are now in the first year of implementation.      
47  All figures are taken from the State Department’s Reports on Assistance to Eurasia that are available under 
http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/c10250.htm. 
48  The selective engagement approach described above is based on this notion. While high levels of assistance to 
reform-minded governments ought to persist, assistance to government displaying unwillingness to reform 
ought to be substantially reduced or diverted (FY 2000:1f.).        27
phasis on supporting non-governmental political actors has borne some fruits, as the coloured 
revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and the Kyrgyz Republic indicate. There is, however, grow-
ing criticism towards the US impetus on “grassroots revolutions” (USAID 2005b). The main 
arguments deem this kind of assistance to be unsustainable and counterproductive for US ef-
forts in other countries (Beissinger 2006). The future of democracy assistance in the NIS re-
mains unclear, as the phasing out of FSA support has begun. 
Promoting democracy in the NIS – comparing the EU and the US 
Comparing the EU’s and the US’ dealings with the NIS, it is noteworthy that the initial posi-
tion for engagement has been comparable for the two actors. After the end of the Cold War 
and the break-up of the Soviet Union, both actors have immediately established intensive rela-
tions with the NIS. Initially, the US had the stronger regional approach, underlined by the 
Freedom Support Act of 1992 that immediately included active democracy promotion. The 
EU seems to have been occupied by its then immediate neighbors and has only by and by in-
troduced its global democracy promotion tools to the countries further to the East. Both actors 
have significant variation in their bilateral relations. These differences are more pronounced 
for the US than for the EU that is again relying on an increasingly standardized framework, 
especially since the creation of the ENP. In contrast, the US has scaled back its regional ap-
proach since the late 1990s, turning to ‘selective engagement’. Interestingly, it is the EU that 
has in 2005 applied sanctions to Uzbekistan. This rupture of cooperative relations is an appli-
cation of its negative democratic conditionality enshrined in the PCA. In comparison, the EU 
does not even have a contractual engagement with Belarus, the primary trouble maker for 
both international actors in the region. 
Comparing actors across regions 
Comparing the EU’s approaches to the two regions, it has to be taken into account that they 
represent the Southern and Eastern dimensions of a common policy framework that is espe-
cially prone to intensive and highly institutionalized relations. Still, there are differences be-
tween the approaches of the EU to the regions both generally and with respect to democracy 
promotion. Thus, the multilateral dimension is lacking in the NIS, where the ENP is not 
backed by a pre-existing regional framework. In both regions, the EU draws on the same 
global tools for democracy promotion and a common regional addition with the APs. Looking 
into the APs in detail, however, reveals an important difference between the specificity of the 
commonly agreed objectives and especially the benchmarks for measuring progress. The lat-
ter are in fact absent in the Southern APs while the Eastern APs include fairly precise objec-
tives and time frames for their realization. This is an indication that the EU’s own claim at   28
standardized – consistent and ‘fair’ – relations with third countries has to be thoroughly inves-
tigated with regard to the criteria for country-variation. 
For the US, it used to be the opposite situation – pursuing a regional approach toward 
the NIS while focusing on few key partners in the MENA region. Common to both regions 
seems to be the US’ strong reliance on bilateral relations in line with its own country-specific 
interests. This has only been disturbed by major global events – in 1989 and 2001 – that have 
triggered regional responses including regional instruments for cooperation and multilateral 
initiatives (FSA, MEPI, and BMENA). Especially the events of September 11, 2001, are am-
biguous in their impact on the US’ democracy promotion agenda in the two regions: While 
efforts to promote democracy have been multiplied in the MENA region, the ‘war on terror’ 
seems to have interfered with the US’ original democracy promotion strategy toward the NIS, 
as becomes apparent in the case of Uzbekistan. 
V. Some Conclusions and Prospects 
With this paper, we have aimed at contributing to the systematic analysis of international de-
mocracy promotion in general and of the European Union and the United States in particular. 
This ever growing field of research is still characterized by few comparable – and compara-
tive – studies and even less attempts at theorization. The ultimate goal should be to explain 
why international democracy promoters are doing what they are doing – and with what effect. 
On the way to explaining variations in strategy and outcome, we hope the ideas and empirical 
findings outlined in this paper will add to the general debate on how to achieve these ambi-
tious goals. 
  Thus, we have first sketched a framework for the analysis of the phenomenon “inter-
national democracy promotion”. Instead of looking for explicit, intentionally devised ‘strate-
gies’, we propose to explore an actor’s empirically discernible efforts to promote democracy. 
In addition to the commitment to promote democracy and the resources allocated to the task, 
we are especially interested in the tools for democracy promotion, as they are the crucial link 
between ‘infrastructure’ and ‘measures’. Thus, the design and the implementation of tools 
reflect different ‘approaches’ to democracy promotion. We have focused on two aspects that 
in our view fundamentally characterize an actor’s efforts: the choice between targeting state 
or non-state actors to bring about democratization (top-down vs. bottom-up approach) and the 
stance taken on the incumbent regime (cooperative vs. conflictive approach). 
We have then tested our analytical framework by comparing the EU’s and US’ efforts 
to promote democracy on a global level and finally across two regions. In general, we found   29
their respective infrastructures at first sight surprisingly similar, with both actors including all 
elements of our tool box, combining bottom-up and top-down approaches and providing 
funds on a comparable level. However, one can see significant differences in the emphasis on 
as well as the specific design of their tools at hand that alter the actual approaches pursued. 
With its focus on ‘dialogue’ and a preference for highly institutionalized and ‘co-owned’ rela-
tions with third countries, the EU follows a rather cooperative approach that potentially limits 
its scope of (re)action. In contrast, the US seems to be more flexible in its choice of tools, thus 
more easily switching between cooperative and conflictive approaches. 
The EU’s leaning towards standardizing its external relations and democracy promo-
tion provisions probably has to be linked to the attempt to enhance the legitimacy of its inter-
national actorness and actions. Formalization and standardization can be seen as a safeguard 
against accusations of arbitrariness and abuse of dependencies, boosting the EU’s credibility 
as a ‘normative’ power. However, this policy of ‘equal treatment’ can also turn against the 
EU if it is not able to implement it convincingly, falling back behind its own standards. Espe-
cially in the inter-regional comparison, significant country-variation in the democracy promo-
tion efforts of both actors has become apparent. Variation in itself need not be a problem for 
the consistency of an actor’s efforts, as long as it is systematically related to a ‘differentiated’ 
strategy. With regard to an actor’s claims about his motivations for democracy promotion, 
however, an analysis of the underlying criteria might be very instructive about its credibility. 
So, explaining this variation is a major challenge for future research on democracy promotion. 
The endeavor would be especially fruitful if it succeeded to verify the often established link 
between the credibility of democracy promotion and its chances of success. In the end, it is to 
hope that international democracy promotion efforts are not trapped in a vicious circle, due to 
an incompatibility of democracy promotion’s legitimacy and effectiveness. 
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